We consider firms in the context of their business ecosystems and explore how differences in the ways in which firms are organized with respect to complementary activities affect their decision to invest in new technologies. We argue that, in addition to creating differences in incentives and bureaucratic costs, firmcomplementor organizational form plays an important role in the firm's ability to coordinate accompanying changes in complementary activities so as to shape the benefits from investing early in the new technology. We test our predictions in the U.S. healthcare industry from [1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006] 
INTRODUCTION
Scholars in management have shed light on a variety of organizational forms that firms use to manage interdependent activities, being explicit about the tradeoffs associated with the different modes of organization (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998; Harrigan, 1984; Hennart, 1993; Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1991a) . A large number of empirical studies have examined the drivers and performance implications of firms' governance choices. However, the literature has been surprisingly silent on how such choices shape firms' strategic behavior, an important precursor to firms' performance. Notable exceptions are Armour and Teece (1980) , who examined how vertical integration affects firms' investments in R&D, and Mullainathan and Scharfstein (2001) , who examined how vertical integration affects firms' investments in production capacity.
An emergent perspective in strategy views a firm's ability to create and appropriate value in the context of its business ecosystem encompassing interdependent activities and value chains (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998; Porter, 1998; Teece, 2007) . Ecosystems are characterized by joint value creation and appropriation among buyers, suppliers, and complementors. The choice of a firm's organizational form with respect to activities in the ecosystem is among the most important choices faced by managers (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Moore, 1996) . However,
scholars have yet to systematically explore the implications of organizational forms in the context of business ecosystems.
In this study, we consider firms' governance choices with respect to activities in the ecosystem and explore how such choices shape an important type of strategic behavior -i.e., investments in new technologies (e.g., Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1992) . We suggest that a firm's ability to create value from a new technology may depend in part on the accompanying changes by actors in the ecosystem, who may need to adapt in order for the new 4 complementor relationship, the hospital-MCO relationship corresponds to a firm-buyer relationship.
We examine a hospital's decision to invest in new medical imaging technologies, one of the critical technological advances that have characterized the health care industry (Burns et al., 2000) . We focus on two distinct imaging technologies: positron emission tomography (PET) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), which have emerged at different periods in the industry. We find that hospitals pursuing alliances with physicians are more likely to invest in new imaging technologies than hospitals that either have an arm's-length relationship or are integrated and employ their own physicians. Among hospitals pursuing alliances, the likelihood of investment in new imaging technologies is increasing in the scope of the alliance. Finally, hospitals pursuing tapered integration with MCOs such that they use both internal and external buyers are more likely to invest in new technologies than hospitals pursuing only arm's-length relationships.
The results from the study, while limited to a single industry, speak to a few important issues in the strategy literature. First, the study contributes to research on firm boundaries by exploring the link between organizational forms and strategic behavior. We argue and show that when the value created by a firm's strategic investment is dependent on accompanying changes among activities in the ecosystem, the firm's governance choices with respect to those activities will have an important bearing on its ability to coordinate such changes and, hence, on its decision to undertake such strategic investments. The finding that hospitals pursuing strategic alliances with physicians are more likely to invest in new imaging technologies than hospitals pursuing integrated strategies reaffirms the need to consider both the costs and the benefits of integration (e.g., Gibbons, 2005) . While integration provides control over complementary activities and may improve coordination among such activities, it may suffer from reduced 5 incentives, bureaucratic costs, and influence activities (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 1975 Williamson, , 1985 . Hence, firms may need to consider tradeoffs regarding ownership of complementary activities, and evaluate alternative hybrid forms that may preserve incentives while allowing for coordinated adaptation (Williamson, 1991a) . Beyond value creation, we also argue that governance choices may influence firms' bargaining power over other players in the ecosystem and shape value appropriation from new technology investments (Harrigan, 1984; Porter, 1980) . This effect was most evident from our finding that hospitals pursuing tapered integration with respect to MCOs were more likely to invest in new technologies than hospitals pursuing market-based contracting.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, we believe that ours is the first study in the strategy literature that has explicitly considered complementors in examining different types of organizational forms and their strategic implications on focal firms. While complements are an important part of the firm's business environment (Brandenburger and Nalebuff; 1998 , Moore, 1993 Porter, 1998; Teece, 2007) , surprisingly little systematic research has been done to examine their interaction with firm strategies and outcomes. 1 We hope that our findings will encourage scholars to expand their analysis of organizational forms from activities in the vertical chain to also consider complements, so as to develop a better understanding of firm strategies in the context of the business ecosystem.
Third, our result regarding hospitals being more likely to invest in new technologies when their alliances with physicians are characterized by broader scope suggests that alliance "design choices" among complementors may have important implications for inter-firm coordination. Scholars analyzing inter-firm alliances and alliance portfolios within a business 6 ecosystem may build on these findings to explore how the design of the alliance rather than its existence per se shapes firms' value creation and appropriation (Aggarwal, Siggelkow and Singh, Forthcoming; Agarwal, Croson, and Mahoney, 2010; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998) .
Finally, we contribute to the literature on technology adoption by showing that a firm's organizational form with respect to activities in the ecosystem has a significant effect on its decision to adopt a new technology. Hence, we add to the factors considered by the adoption literature (e.g., Geroski, 2000; Griliches, 1957; Rogers, 1995) by suggesting that the distribution of organizational forms in a given industry plays an important role in explaining the pattern of new technology adoption.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Faced with the opportunity of investing in new technologies, firms face important tradeoffs (e.g., Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1992) .
On the one hand, investing in the new technology may allow a firm to assert its technology leadership and create competitive advantage. On the other hand, given the technological and market uncertainty, investing in a new technology may also expose a firm to significant financial risk of whether it can profit from the new technology.
How does a firm's organizational form with respect to activities in the ecosystem affect its propensity to undertake new technology investments? We explore this question by drawing on arguments from organizational economics and strategy literatures (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gibbons, 2005; Harrigan, 1984; Williamson, 1985 Williamson, , 1991 
Organization of Firms and Complementors
The literature in organizational economics has suggested some important tradeoffs that exist between the market and hierarchy forms of organization These tradeoffs can be broadly categorized along the dimensions of "cost of organization" and "adaptability of organization" (e.g., Gibbons, 2005; Williamson, 1991a) . The cost of a given organizational form entails the intensity of incentives for the respective parties (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) , the bureaucratic costs associated with governance and decision-making (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1985 , and the influence activities in which parties attempt to influence decisions or the allocation of resources towards their personal gain (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) . Adaptability refers to the extent to which two parties can generate a coordinated response to changing market and technological circumstances characterized by high levels of uncertainty (Barnard, 1938; Williamson, 1991a; 1991b) . 2 On the one hand, while hierarchy enjoys superiority in adaptability, it suffers from a high cost of organization. On the other hand, while market provides high-8 powered incentives and is not subject to bureaucratic costs or influence activities, it suffers from limited adaptability.
The alliance form of organization exhibits characteristics of a hybrid between markets and hierarchies (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Menard, 2004; Williamson, 1991a) . It provides greater incentives than hierarchies, as partners retain autonomy over their tasks and the associated payoffs. It also enables greater adaptability than markets, as cooperating partners develop communication channels and codes to facilitate knowledge sharing and coordination of interdependent tasks (Doz, 1996; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati, Lawrence, and Puranam, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002) .
Successful commercialization of a new technology often requires accompanying changes in complementary activities within the ecosystem (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Hughes, 1983; Rosenberg, 1976; Teece, 2007) . The commercialization phase of a new technology would entail coordinated adaptation by focal firms and complementors, who would need to make mutual adjustments in their respective activities during a period of technological and market uncertainty (Teece, 2007; Williamson, 1991a An important feature of the integrated organizational form is that it facilitates coordinated adaptation (Williamson, 1991a) . This enhanced adaptability might make an integrated firm more likely to invest in a new technology than firms using an arm's-length or an alliance relationship.
However, such a prediction would have only considered the benefits while ignoring the costs of integration. This would have been inconsistent with the theories of the firm that explicitly recognize the need to consider both the costs and the benefits of integration. For example, Grossman and Hart (1986) develop a theory of how common ownership shifts the distribution of surplus created by the two complementary parties, creating incentive distortions and resulting in underinvestment. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) develop a theory of how authority in an integrated firm results in parties lobbying to influence decision makers for their own personal benefit. Such influence activities are costly for an integrated firm, as they lower the quality of decision making and divert the attention and effort of parties from more productive activities.
Finally, Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 describes how internalizing a transaction within a firm creates different types of bureaucratic distortions, such as procurement practices that favor internal units despite a more profitable external alternative, and persistence tendencies that favor continuation of unproductive or obsolete projects.
3 It is certainly plausible that alliance between focal firms and complementors can also help to increase the focal firms' relative bargaining power over downstream buyers. This would increase the value that a firm can capture from the new technology and may be another reason that firms that have an alliance relationship with complementors will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that have an arm's-length relationship.
As compared to an integrated form, an alliance form is relatively free from such organizational costs, since focal firms and complementors retain autonomy over their respective
tasks. An important differentiating feature of a firm-complementor alliance as compared to a firm-supplier alliance is that the price mechanism of the market that provides for high-powered incentives is likely to be preserved. Compared to a firm-supplier alliance, in which long-term contracts and high customer bargaining power can result in suppliers being governed like organizational units, resulting in incentive attenuation (Makadok and Coff, 2009; Williamson, 1991a 
Alliance Scope as a Shift Parameter
Research on alliances has suggested that the choice of alliance scope is among the most important choices considered by partnering firms (e.g., Doz and Hamel, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998; Oxley and Sampson, 2004) . Alliance scope refers to the extent of activities that partners jointly carry out through the alliance as compared to their total set of activities. The broader the scope of activities carried out within the alliance, the greater the extent of common benefits that alliance partners derive from their relationships (Khanna et al., 1998) . Greater common benefits help to align the incentives between partnering firms and facilitate cooperation (Agarwal et al., 2010; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998) . Broader alliance scope would also make it easier for firms to identify and coordinate changes in the interdependent activities that will interact with the new technology. Hence, the broader the scope of alliance between firms and complementors, the more effective the firms will be in their commercialization of the new technology.
The combination of hypotheses 1 and 2 suggests that we are proposing an inverted Ushaped relationship between the firm-complementor organizational form along the markethierarchy continuum and the firm's propensity to invest in a new technology. We now suggest that the scope of the alliance, by affecting the extent of cooperation and coordination, can act as a shift parameter for the propensity of firms using the alliance mode to invest in a new technology. Hence, the broader the scope of the alliance between firms and their complementors, the greater the likelihood that firms would invest in a new technology.
Hypothesis 3: The broader the scope of the alliance between firms and their complementors, the greater the likelihood that firms will invest in a new technology.
Figure 1 illustrates our theoretical framework linking firm-complementor organizational form to the firm's likelihood of investment in a new technology.
Organization of Firms and Buyers Finally, we consider how firms' governance choices with respect to downstream buyers will affect their likelihood of investment in new technologies. Besides the arm's-length relationship, we consider a plural form of governance in which a firm uses both arm's-length and integrated strategies. This form of governance, often referred to in the strategy literature as tapered integration (Porter, 1980) , has been documented for both upstream activities (Harrigan, 1986; Jacobides and Billinger, 2006; Parmigiani, 2007; Rothaermel et al., 2006) and downstream activities (Dutta et al., 1995; Harrigan, 1986; La Fontaine, 1992; Michael, 2000) in the firm's value chain.
While tapered integration with respect to downstream buyers is more costly to set up and more complex to manage than the pure market form, its benefits include reduced information asymmetry that mitigates hold-up hazards, greater bargaining power, and lower demand uncertainty (Dutta et al., 1995; Harrigan, 1986; Michael, 2000; Porter, 1980) . Compared to full integration, tapered integration also limits the dulling of incentives and bureaucratic distortions, as firms rely on both internal and external parties for downstream tasks (e.g., Porter, 1980) .
5
Firms pursuing tapered integration strategies will face lower risk during the commercialization of the new technology, as they have preferred access to their downstream buyers. Given that buyers may incur specialized investments to commercialize the new technology, tapered integration also reduces the likelihood of hold-ups. Finally, greater bargaining power would allow firms using tapered integration strategies to appropriate more value from the new technology than firms pursuing market-based strategies. Hence, firms 5 Most of our arguments regarding governance choices of downstream buyers also apply to upstream suppliers. However, we focus on the downstream buyers to maintain consistency with our empirical context.
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pursuing tapered integration with respect to downstream buyers will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms pursuing arm's-length relationships.
Hypothesis 4: Firms that pursue tapered integration strategies downstream in their vertical chains will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that pursue arm's-length relationships.

METHODOLOGY
Industry Background
The context for our study is the U.S. health care industry. We focus on three critical players that constitute the delivery of health care services-hospitals, physicians, and managed care organizations (MCOs). Our focal firms are hospitals that provide facilities and staff to diagnose and treat patients. Physicians are the primary source of medical expertise for the diagnosis and treatment. The service provided by the physicians is a complement to the service provided by the hospitals, and hence physicians are key complementors to the hospitals (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998: 12) . Hospitals' (and physicians') services are packaged and distributed by MCOs downstream as health plans to end-users. Hence, while the hospital-physician relationship corresponds to a firm-complementor relationship, the hospital-MCO relationship corresponds to a firm-distributor relationship. The complementary relationship between hospitals and physicians has also been acknowledged by Gaynor (2006) in his recent review of research on hospitalphysician relationships in the health care literature. He notes that hospitals and physicians depend on each other for creating value and that their respective services are sold downstream to the buyers. The simplified schema of the health care delivery ecosystem is shown in Figure 2 .
The managed care organization (MCO) is a critical player in the delivery of health care services. MCOs in a given market package and distribute the services offered by hospitals and physicians as health plans. The emergence of MCOs in the early 1980s was in response to significant escalation of health care costs under the traditional fee-for-service system, in which patients were billed for each service provided and the claims were reimbursed from insurers. The insurers themselves did not play any part in the management of the delivery of services such that patients could get a service from any provider and receive a pre-determined reimbursement for that service from the insurer. Because of the fragmented nature of the payment and delivery functions, health care costs rose rapidly (Weisbrod, 1991) .
MCOs integrated both the delivery of health care services and the payment functions, and focused on lowering health care costs while maintaining quality. A key feature of the MCO business model was to negotiate low rates with select providers (both hospitals and physicians) and to offer a variety of health plans to meet the needs of different market segments. By stimulating competition among health care providers in order for them to be considered in the network of service providers and by enforcing strict cost controls, especially with respect to new and more expensive services, MCOs slowed the rate of increase in health care costs (Teisberg, Porter, and Brown, 1994) . The emergence of MCOs imposed significant pressure on hospitals and physicians to improve their competitive position by lowering their costs and/or improving the quality of their services. In addition, hospitals and physicians took steps to increase their bargaining power over MCOs in order to receive greater reimbursement for their services. These 15 considerations led to a wave of mergers, acquisitions, and alliances among service providers (Bazzoli et al., 2004) , as well as hospitals acquiring equity interest in some MCOs (Shortell, Morrison, and Hughes, 1989) .
Hospital-Physician Governance Forms
The health care industry provides an ideal context in which to explore the implications of firm-complementor governance modes. The context is characterized by a wide variety of hospital-physician governance forms that include arm's-length relationships, alliances with varying degrees of scope, and fully integrated organizations in which physicians are employed by hospitals (e.g., Burns and Thorpe, 1993; Ciliberto and Dranove, 2006; Cuellar and Gertler, 2006 ).
On the one end of the governance continuum, an arm's-length relationship between hospitals and physicians entail that while physicians have admitting privileges in hospitals, they remain independent with respect to contracting with MCOs, administrative tasks, and information systems. On the other end of the continuum, an integrated salary model entails that hospitals employ their own physicians.
Besides the arm's-length and integrated modes, four different types of alliance modes are extensively used by hospitals and physicians (AHA, 2009) . A key distinguishing factor among these hybrid choices is the scope of the activities that are carried out through the alliance relationship. First, the Independent Practice Association (IPA) alliance entails that hospitals and physicians pursue joint contracting with MCOs while retaining autonomy over administrative tasks and information systems (e.g., Burns et al., 2000; Cuellar and Gertler, 2006 ). An IPA alliance is relatively easy to organize and incurs minimal set-up costs. Second, the Open 16 Physician Hospital Organization (OPHO) alliance is responsible for coordinating administrative tasks between hospitals and physicians as well as negotiating and managing contracts with MCOs. Third, in the Closed Physician Hospital Organization (CPHO) alliance, physicians are exclusively contracted to the hospitals, and the scope of the alliance also extends to coordinating care for the patients (e.g., Cuellar and Gertler, 2006) . Finally, the Management Service Organization (MSO) alliance emulates most of the features of the CPHO alliance except that the joint-venture is also responsible for supporting the services of the physicians through staff and equipment. The MSO's services include office support, purchasing and operation of information systems, patient billings and collections, and contract marketing and negotiations (Brown, 1996) .
Data
The primary source of data for the study is the American Hospital Association (AHA), et al., 1995) . A typical investment in these technologies includes capital expenditure in excess of $2 million to purchase the equipment and additional maintenance and personnel costs. As with most strategic investments, hospitals face the dilemma of whether and when to invest in these imaging technologies. An earlier investment may allow a hospital to position itself as a technology leader (Luft et al., 1986) and gain market share over its rivals (e.g., Ho, 2009 ).
However, earlier investments are also made under considerable risk regarding the capability and the implementation of the new technology, the extent of market demand, and the level of reimbursements that the hospital will receive from MCOs (Teplensky et al., 1995) . -
In some instances, there was inconsistency in the reported data. A hospital might report the technology as available one year but not the next. In other cases, a hospital reported the availability of the technology in one year but the data were missing the following year and resumed in later years. We tested for the robustness of our findings by following the procedure In order to test the effect of alliance scope, we created separate categories of low, medium, and high alliance scope. Our categorization is based on the rank ordering of the extent of activities that hospitals and physicians carry out through the alliance as compared to their total set of activities (e.g., Khanna et al., 1998) . An IPA alliance is characterized by hospitals and physicians collaborating on contracting with MCOs while retaining autonomy over administrative tasks, information systems, and patient care (e.g., Burns et al., 2000; Cuellar and Gertler, 2006 and White, 1998). There are advantages and disadvantages with each of these data sources (Dranove et al., 1998) . In this study, we used Medicare managed care penetration rate data Finally, we include state fixed effects to control for unobserved differences in health care
regulation (e.g., certificate of need) across the different states (Hillman and Schwartz, 1985) . Table 1 provides a brief summary of the variables used in the analysis.
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Analysis
Many hospitals in our sample did not invest in the medical imaging technologies during the period of observation. Hence, our data is right-censored. Consistent with prior studies examining the firm's timing of strategic investments in new technologies (e.g., Baker, 2001; Mitchell, 1989) , we used hazard rate models to test our predictions. Specifically, we used the Cox semiparametric proportional hazards model, which allows for a fully flexible, nonparametric baseline hazard, and hence does not require making additional assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard over time (Cox, 1975) .
In addition, a number of hospitals in our sample had invested in the MRI technologies prior to the first available observation in our dataset, and hence these observations were leftcensored. We follow the standard approach in the literature to exclude the observations that were left-censored (Allison, 1982) . To ensure that our results are not biased by the exclusion of these observations, we separately estimated the effects of our covariates on the left-censored observations using the probit model. The results from the probit model, reported in the robustness tests section, are nearly identical to the results obtained from the Cox models. Table 2 shows the summary statistics and correlations between our covariates. Table 3 reports the results from the Cox models for the two different medical imaging technologies. Models 1 and 4 are our baseline models for the hospitals' adoption of PET and MRI technologies, respectively. Models 2 and 3 allow us to test our predictions using data from hospitals' adoption of PET technology, and Models 5 and 6 allow us to test our predictions using data from hospitals' adoption of MRI technology.
RESULTS
-----------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 
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The results from the baseline models are consistent with our expectations and prior research in the health care industry (e.g., Baker and Phibbs, 2002; Hillman and Schwartz, 1985; Robinson, 1996; Teplensky et al., 1995) . On the one hand, hospitals that are large, are not-forprofit, are members of a medical school association, and have greater capacity utilization are more likely to invest in the new medical imaging technologies. On the other hand, hospitals that have a greater outpatient ratio and are located in more concentrated markets are less likely to invest in the new technologies. The estimates for MCO penetration are negative and significant for both PET and MRI technologies. Hence, our results provide continued support of prior findings that the emergence of MCOs is negatively correlated with hospitals' investments in new technologies (Baker and Phibbs, 2002; Baker, 2001; Mas and Seinfeld, 2008) . The coefficient for the number of hospitals is negative but insignificant.
While we expected hospitals that are members of a teaching school association to be more likely to invest in the new technology, we found this effect to be positive and significant only for the PET technology. The significant and negative effect for MRI technology could be due to the fact that many of these hospitals that had invested in the MRI technology were leftcensored and hence excluded from the sample. This was confirmed in our estimates from the probit model using the left-censored data. Finally, the coefficient for Not-for-Profit was negative and significant for MRI technology only.
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In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that firms that have an alliance relationship with their complementors will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that have an arm'slength relationship. This prediction was supported for both technologies (Models 2 and 5). Note that our baseline category is the arm's-length relationship between the hospitals and the physicians. The coefficients for complementor alliance are significant and positive for both PET and MRI technologies. In considering the magnitude of estimated coefficients, we see that hospitals that have an alliance relationship with physicians are 32% (33%) more likely to invest in the PET (MRI technology) than hospitals that have an arm's-length relationship with physicians.
In Hypothesis 2, we predicted that firms that have an alliance relationship with their complementors will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that integrate into the complementary activities. The coefficient for complementor integration is insignificant for both PET and MRI technologies. A comparison of the coefficients for complementor alliance with that for complementor integration using the Wald test (Table 4) In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that a firm's propensity to invest in the new technology is increasing in the scope of the firm-complementor alliance. Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient of alliance scope in Table 4 is increasing in the scope of the alliance. With the exception of low alliance scope for the PET technology, all of the alliance scope coefficients are positive and significant. Hospitals with low alliance scope are 21% more likely to invest in the MRI technology than hospitals that have an arm's-length relationship with physicians. Hospitals with medium alliance scope are 26% (27%) more likely to invest in the PET (MRI) technology 25 than hospitals that have an arm's-length relationship with physicians. Finally, hospitals with high alliance scope are 45% (65%) more likely to invest in the PET (MRI) technology than hospitals that have an arm's-length relationship with physicians. A comparison of the coefficients for the low and high alliance scope using the Wald test supports Hypothesis 3 for both technologies. However, the difference between the coefficients for the medium and high alliance scope was significant only for MRI technology, and the difference between the coefficients for the low and medium alliance scope was insignificant for both PET and MRI technologies.
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Finally, in Hypothesis 4, we predicted that firms pursuing tapered integration strategies downstream in their vertical chains are more likely to invest in new technology than firms pursuing market-based strategies. This prediction was supported for both technologies. The coefficient for buyer tapered integration is significant and positive for both PET and MRI technologies. Hospitals that use tapered integration strategies with MCOs are 15% (25%) more likely to invest in PET (MRI) technology than hospitals that use only arm's-length relationships.
Robustness Tests
An important issue to consider with our analysis is the possibility of hospitals self selecting into the different governance modes that could potentially bias our estimates. In order to test the robustness of our results to this potential endogeneity bias, we used a matching estimator approach. Matching estimators have been widely used in economics and have recently been used by scholars in management to address selection bias in empirical specifications (e.g., 26 Gonzalez and Pazo, 2008; Rawley and Simcoe, 2009; Sampson, 2005; Zhao, 2009 ). This nonparametric approach compares the statistical results obtained in a treatment group with those obtained in a comparable control group. The main purpose of the matching estimator is to try to reestablish the conditions of a natural experiment so that the comparison between the two groups allows for a causal inference (Abadie, Drukker et al., 2004) . We use matching estimators to evaluate the effect of hospital-physician and hospital-MCO governance modes on the hospital's propensity to invest in new imaging technologies. Our control group is drawn from the hospitals that maintained the same organizational form throughout the period of study. Our treatment group is drawn from the hospitals that shifted their organizational form.
We briefly illustrate the specification that we use to estimate our results. Let i index the hospital in our sample, and let T be a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if hospital shifts However, Yi(1) and Yi(0) are not simultaneously observable. For example, in our study, we cannot observe the same hospital to shift from alliance to integration and maintain the alliance mode as well. In other words, the two events -shifting and maintaining the governance mode are mutually exclusive.
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The matching estimators provide an alternative approach. Let j (while i≠j) index the hospitals in our sample, and assume that hospitals i and j closely match each other based on the observables. By observing Y i (0)and Y j (1), we can use Y j (1) as a counterfactual value of Y i (1). We use the bias-corrected nearest-neighbor matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006) to find the counterfactual value. 9 For each hospital i, the standard nearest-neighbor matching estimator searches for the most similar hospital with the opposite treatment. We match hospitals based on hospital attributes, MCO penetration, market competition, and demand.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 plot the kernel densities of the propensity scores for the unmatched and matched treatment and control groups. The effectiveness of our matching procedure is evident from greater similarity in kernel densities among the matched groups as compared to the unmatched groups.
-----------------------------------------------------------Insert Figures 4, 5, and 6 about here -----------------------------------------------------------
Our main results are supported if we find that the difference in the likelihood of investment between the treatment and the control groups is significant in our predicted direction.
For example, with respect to Hypothesis 1, our control group comprises hospitals that use an alliance mode, and the matched treatment group comprises hospitals that shift from an alliance to an arm's-length relationship with physicians. Hypothesis 1 is supported if we find that the hospitals in the treatment group are less likely to invest in the new imaging technology than similar hospitals in the control group. The results, reported in Table 5 , are fully supportive of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. While we would have preferred to test the robustness of all hypotheses, 28 we are limited by our data. Only a small number of hospitals have changed the scope of the alliance during the period of study, and hence we are unable to create robust control and treatment groups to test Hypothesis 3. Table 5 about here  ----------------------------------------- Another potential concern with our analysis is that in estimating the hospital's likelihood of investment in MRI technology, we excluded a large number of hospitals who had adopted the technology prior to our window of observation. It is possible that the exclusion of these leftcensored observations may have created a selection bias in our sample. To ensure that our results for the MRI technology are not biased by the exclusion of these hospitals, we performed a crosssectional analysis using a probit model for the year 1995, the first year of observation in the study. The estimated results from the probit model, reported in Table 6 , are nearly identical to the results from the Cox models and provide additional support for our predictions. Table 6 about here
DISCUSSION
The organization of activities within and outside firm boundaries has long been of interest to scholars in economics and strategic management. Scholars have shed light on a variety of organizational forms that firms use to manage interdependent activities, being explicit about the tradeoffs associated with the different governance modes (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998; Harrigan, 1986; Hennart, 1993; Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1991a) . This study contributes to that literature by examining the relationship between firms' governance choices and an important type of strategic behavior -i.e., investments in new technologies. We expand the analysis of 29 organizational forms from the literature's focus on the upstream and downstream activities in the firm's vertical chain to also consider complements that are a vital part of the firm's business ecosystem (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998; Teece, 2007) . Our central premise is that by facilitating the coordination of changes that underlie the commercialization of new technology and by enhancing the firm's strategic position with respect to other players in its ecosystem, a firm's organizational form plays an important role in creating and capturing value from investments in new technology.
We test our arguments in the context of the U.S. health care industry from 1995 to 2006.
We explore how hospitals' investments in new imaging technologies are shaped by their mode of governance with physicians-key complementors to hospitals-and with MCOs-primary distributors of hospital and physician services. We find that hospitals that pursue alliances with physicians are more likely to invest in new imaging technologies than hospitals that either have an arm's-length relationship with physicians or are integrated and employ their own physicians.
We also find that among hospitals pursuing alliances with physicians, the likelihood of investments in new imaging technologies is increasing in the scope of the alliance. Finally, we find that hospitals that pursue tapered integration strategies with MCOs such that they use both hierarchy-and market-based governance modes are more likely to invest in new imaging technologies than hospitals that use only market-based governance.
The study contributes to some important issues in the strategy literature. While a vast body of empirical literature has explored the determinants and performance implications of firm boundaries and governance modes, the literature has been surprisingly silent on how such governance choices affect strategic behavior, an important precursor to firm performance within its competitive environment. We hope that our results would encourage scholars to integrate their 30 examination of coordination among interdependent activities with that of competition among rivals and other players in the ecosystem so as to improve our understanding of firm strategies and competitive advantage.
We believe that ours is the first study in the strategy literature that has explicitly considered complements in examining different types of organizational forms and their strategic implications for focal firms. In contrast to the predominant supply-side efficiency considerations that are made with respect to firms' governance modes, the analysis of complements allows for the inclusion of demand side benefits that firms may enjoy by coordinating complementary activities and enhancing the value of their focal products or services.
An interesting result of the study was the inverted U-shaped relationship that we observed with respect to the hospital-physician governance choices along the market-hierarchy continuum and the likelihood of technology investment. Hospitals pursuing alliances with physicians were more likely to invest in new imaging technologies than hospitals pursuing either arm's-length or integrated modes. While scholars have emphasized the tradeoffs that exist between market-and hierarchy-based organizational forms (Dyer, Kale, and Singh, 2004; Gibbons, 2005; Williamson, 1991a) , our results support the conjecture that the hybrid alliance form may provide a more balanced mode of organization that allows for coordination while preserving incentives. This result also supports call for empirical research on firm boundaries to consider a broader set of governance modes (e.g., Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) in order to better understand the tradeoffs associated with each of the organizational forms.
The literature on strategic alliances has provided useful dimensions to help characterize the different types of alliances. Among them, the scope of the alliance between alliance partners has been widely recognized to be an important "design" choice (e.g., Doz and Hamel, 1998;  31 Khanna et al., 1998) . Our results reinforce the need to consider the variance in alliance scope rather than the existence of the alliance per se. Moreover, alliances between complementors are becoming increasingly prevalent and we hope that our study would encourage scholars examining firms' alliance portfolios to explicitly consider alliance between complementors as part of the firms' alliance strategies.
Finally, our findings contribute to the understanding of technology adoption in the context of business ecosystems. We add to the factors considered by the adoption literature (e.g., Geroski, 2000; Griliches, 1957; Rogers, 1995) by suggesting that the distribution of organizational forms in a given industry would play an important role in explaining the pattern of new technology adoption. For example, the relative distribution of hospitals that have an alliance relationship with physicians would affect the pace with which hospitals adopt new imaging technologies. Scholars examining patterns of technology adoption could benefit from an explicit consideration of heterogeneity in organizational forms in explaining the rate of technology adoption. The consistency in the results among the two technologies in which we examined the adoption patterns of different types of adopters (Rogers, 1995) -innovators and early adopters in the case of PET technology and majority adopters in the case of MRI technology, provide further evidence that our theorized mechanisms are likely to be independent of some of the dominant explanations in the adoption literature.
While we have taken care in this examination, the study of course has a number of limitations. It is conducted in the context of a single industry and we are unable to establish the generalizability of our findings across different settings. It will be of interest to see whether our results can be replicated in other contexts and what boundary conditions may be needed to extend the generalizability of our findings. Our focus on medical imaging technologies, while 32 allowing for an examination of a significant technology investment by hospitals, precludes us from making generic assertions on all forms of technology investments. For example, our predictions are based on a key premise that the successful commercialization of technologies requires coordinated changes between focal firms and complementors. It is possible that certain technological investments may not have a direct bearing on complementary activities and therefore, will be outside the scope of our predictions. Another important caveat of this study is that we are not implying a correspondence between a firm's technology investment and its performance outcome. We are merely suggesting a correspondence between a firm's organizational form and its propensity to invest in new technologies. Hence, we make no claims that in our context, alliances are a superior form of governance. Finally, while we have attempted to address the endogeneity bias that may exist due to hospital's self-selection into the different governance modes through additional robustness tests, we cannot fully address this possibility.
In conclusion, the study situates a firm in the context of its business ecosystem encompassing interdependent activities and value chains. It explores how organizational choices -arm's-length contracting, alliance or ownership, with respect to complementary activities and downstream distribution affect the firms' investments into new technologies. We contribute to the literature on firm boundaries by considering how boundary choices and governance modes shape firm behavior within the competitive environment. We also move beyond the literature's focus on upstream inputs and downstream distribution to also consider complements that form an important part of the firm's business environment. We hope that our results would encourage scholars to extend research on firm boundary and governance choices to explore the link between 33 coordination mechanisms and competitive behavior, and to consider such choices in the context of the business ecosystems. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Our baseline category of hospital-physician governance mode is the arm's-length relationship. 
